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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF U.S. MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS
Michael A. Newton*
The Obama Administration confronts many of the same practical and legal 
complexities that interagency experts debated in the fall of 2001. Military 
commissions remain a valid, if unwieldy, tool to be used at the discretion of 
a Commander-in-Chief. Refinement of the commission procedures has con-
sumed thousands of legal hours within the Department of Defense, as well 
as a significant share of the Supreme Court docket. In practice, the military 
commissions have not been the charade of justice created by an over-
powerful and unaccountable chief executive that critics predicted. In light of 
the permissive structure of U.S. statutes and the framework of international 
precedent, there is no requirement for complete consistency between the 
procedures applicable to military commissions and Article III courts. The 
synergistic efforts of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches makes 
the current military commissions lawful and without question “established 
by law” as required by international norms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The inception and implementation of the Military Commissions in 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks generated a storm of legis-
lation and litigation that may be barely abated at the tenth anniversary ob-
servances of the attacks. As the President declared a state of national emer-
gency,1
* Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Professor Newton 
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Americans were aroused into a frenzy of reflexive uncertainty and 
unified patriotism. In short order, the complacency of peaceful normality 
gave way to a rising urgency of warlike rhetoric and resolve. The U.N. Se-
curity Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368 categorizing the attacks 
as a “threat to international peace and security,” affirming the “inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense” expressed in Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, and specifically directing “all States to work together urgently 
to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist 
1 Proclamation No. 7,463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).
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attacks.”2 For the first time in its storied existence, The North Atlantic Trea-
ty Organization (NATO) invoked the principle of Article 5 of the Washing-
ton Treaty, thereby recognizing that the attacks constituted an “armed at-
tack” consistent with the Treaty’s provisions that trigger NATO obligations 
to assist another member so attacked.3
On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed a Joint Session 
of Congress, aware that the world—and perhaps the terrorist network—was 
listening. The President declared that “we are a country awakened to danger 
and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to 
resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our 
enemies, justice will be done.”4 The Congress responded by enacting the 
Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces 
Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the 
United States (AUMF). The AUMF authorizes the President “to use all ne-
cessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or per-
sons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 . . . .”5
Almost simultaneously, the White House authorized a small intera-
gency team of experts to develop the available options for prosecuting al-
Qaeda and Taliban fighters who could reasonably be expected to enter into 
U.S. custody following combat operations.6
2 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). The Security Council stressed 
that “those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring [sic] the perpetrators, organizers 
and sponsors of these attacks will be held accountable.” Id.
Drawn from the Departments of 
3 Press Release, NATO, Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed (Oct. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
4 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (September 20, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/092001.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 
2009). Secretary of State Powell echoed a similar sentiment in his first public comments 
made in Lima, Peru:
A terrible, terrible tragedy has befallen my nation, . . . but . . . you can be sure that 
America will deal with this tragedy in a way that brings those responsible to jus-
tice. You can be sure that as terrible a day as this is for us, we will get through it
because we are a strong nation, a nation that believes in itself.
BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 10 (2002).
5 Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those 
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 
115 Stat. 224 (2001).
6 Following the enactment of the Military Commissions Act, a similar interagency team 
was assembled to draft and promulgate the rules and procedures that would be applicable to 
trials conducted pursuant to the statutory structure envisioned by Congress. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, Executive Summary (2007),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissionsmanual.html [hereinafter 
MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS].
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Justice, State, and Defense, the interagency working group began to prepare 
an extensive and detailed decision-making memorandum to guide the Ex-
ecutive branch in evaluating the relative merits of the various prosecutorial 
and legal options.7
Military operations began the first week of October 2001 with 
strikes at the heart of the Taliban controlled safe havens from which al-
Qaeda planned and launched the attacks on America;
As the days turned into weeks, and the interagency ex-
perts worked towards a comprehensive document based on interagency con-
sensus, the national mood demanded decisive progress.
8 the lingering legal 
debates took on a renewed urgency and import, as the pressure for swift 
action increased. Implementing the congressional authorization drawn from 
the AUMF, and exercising his inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief of 
the armed forces,9
The Military Order [PMO] authorized the Department of Defense to 
establish military commissions to bring to justice non-citizen members of 
al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that were complicit in the attacks 
against the U.S.
President Bush bypassed the interagency experts and 
issued a hastily drafted Military Order on November 16, 2001.
10 Following the passage of the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006,11 the Department of Defense completed and promulgated a wholly 
new Manual for Military Commissions.12
7 See id.
8 See Ian Christopher McCaleb, Bush Announces Opening of Attacks, CNN, Oct. 7, 
2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/ret.attack.bush/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
9 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
10 Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
PMO]. Nearly four years later, Congress implicitly acceded to the President’s exercise of 
executive authority in November of 2001 by mandating that the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any 
final decision rendered pursuant to Military Commission Order No. 1.” 10 U.S.C. § 801 note 
(2006).
11 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2631–32
(2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006)).
12 MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, supra note 6. The Manual is made up of four 
separate sections: the Preamble, the Rules for Military Commissions, the Military Commis-
sion Rules of Evidence, and the Crimes and Elements. The Rules for Military Commissions 
set forth the procedural rules for Military Commissions. The Executive Summary notes:
This Manual is the product of a tremendous interagency effort. Principally military 
judge advocates and attorneys from the Departments of Defense and Justice, using 
the Manual for Courts-Martial as a guide, undertook the initial drafting. Drafts 
were then coordinated with other relevant agencies to ensure that specific rules and 
procedures reflect careful consideration of our nation’s intelligence activities, as 
called for in the MCA. The overriding considerations reflected in the Manual for 
Military Commissions are fairness and fidelity to the Military Commissions Act of 
2006. It is intended to ensure that alien unlawful enemy combatants who are sus-
pected of war crimes and certain other offenses are prosecuted before regularly 
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Although only three trials have been completed using the military 
commissions process, and refinement of the procedures has consumed thou-
sands of legal hours within the Department of Defense, as well as a signifi-
cant share of the Supreme Court docket, the future remains clouded with 
enormous uncertainty. After more than eight years of delay and debate, the 
original goal of expediency and swift judicial processes seems tragically 
naïve in retrospect.
As the Obama Administration confronts many of the same practical 
and legal complexities that the interagency team began to debate in the fall 
of 2001, the intervening events warrant some proven conclusions. In partic-
ular, military commissions remain a valid, if unwieldy, tool to be used at the 
discretion of a Commander-in-Chief. This short essay will outline three of 
the most important conclusions that have been solidified by the post 9/11 
practice of modern U.S. military commissions.
II. DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF MILITARY INADEQUACY
The Presidential Order of November 2001 was based on the conclu-
sion that when the U.S. is actively engaged in an armed conflict, national 
security interests permit military authorities to enforce the substantive 
norms governing the conduct of hostilities by developing commission in-
structions and regulations consistent with the right to a fair trial for those 
accused of crimes.13 In accordance with the lex specialis of the laws and 
customs of warfare,14
constituted courts affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as in-
dispensable by civilized people. This Manual will have an historic impact for our 
military and our country.
the Order delegated promulgation authority to the 
Id. (emphasis added).
13 PMO, supra note 10, § 4(c)(4). The President determined that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence are inapplicable to military commissions. The Military Order noted:
Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international 
terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under this order, I find consistent with 
section 836 of title 10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in mil-
itary commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence 
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district 
courts.
Id. § 1(f). The President based his determination on the unique factors present in conducting 
judicial proceedings against suspected war criminals at a time when the U.S. is actively 
engaged in an ongoing conflict.
14 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 240 (July 8, 1996), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf (stating 
that the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life applies during armed conflict, but the 
test of what constitutes an arbitrary depravation of life during an armed conflict must be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis: humanitarian law as opposed to the broader prin-
ciples of generalized human rights norms).
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Secretary of Defense to develop regulations governing the conduct of the 
commissions that must, inter alia: provide a full and fair trial; admit proba-
tive evidence; protect sensitive and classified information; provide represen-
tation by counsel; and convict and sentence only upon the concurrence of at 
least two-thirds of commission members.15 The Secretary of Defense duti-
fully promulgated orders16 while the Department of Defense General Coun-
sel issued instructions17 intended to provide potential defendants the range 
of rights necessary to assure a “full and fair trial” in compliance with the 
President’s specific order.18
Critics at the time panned this “fair trial” requirement as a hollow 
platitude. Some critics recalled the words of one eminent and internationally 
recognized expert who has used the phrase “Potemkin Justice” to describe 
enforcement efforts aimed at achieving only a shadow of justice through 
undermining the core human rights of those who will face charges under the 
power of overweening executive authority.19
15 PMO, supra note 10, § 4.
Avoidance of this is the ratio-
nale behind the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
16 Six Military Commission Orders have been promulgated, two of which have been 
revoked. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDERS, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissions_orders.html.
17 Ten Military Commission Instructions were promulgated, four of which have been 
revised since publication. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION 
INSTRUCTIONS, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissions_instructions.html 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2009). “On March 24, 2006, the General Counsel of the Department of 
Defense issued Military Commission Instruction No. 10, Certain Evidentiary Requirements
in response to growing public concern that evidence acquired through torture might be ad-
missible in military commission proceedings.” Human Rights Watch, Q & A on Military 
Commission Instruction Number 10, Will it Keep Evidence Obtained by Torture or Cruel 
Treatment out of Commission Trials?, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2006/03/31/
usdom13109_txt.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
18 U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by 
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 
5 (Mar. 21, 2002), 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.1–9.12 (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf [hereinafter MCO No. 1]. MCO No.1 also contains proce-
dural protections for an accused. In particular, each detainee tried before a military commis-
sion is entitled to: (1) the presumption of innocence; (2) trial before an impartial panel; (3) 
notice of charges in a language the detainee understands; (4) call witnesses and present evi-
dence; (5) cross examine witnesses and evidence; (6) elect not to testify with no negative 
inference drawn there-from; (7) a detailed defense counsel and the right to civilian defense 
counsel at the detainee’s expense; (8) privileged communication with defense counsel; (9) 
open proceedings to the maximum extent possible; (10) proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and (11) appellate review by a three-member review panel. MCO No. 1 does not refer to 
“rights” of the accused; rather, it references “procedures to be afforded [to] the accused.” Id.
§ 5. MCO No. 1 further states that “[t]his Order is not intended to and does not create any
right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party . . . .” Id. § 10.
19 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 703 
(2003).
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(ICCPR) requirement that a criminal trial be a “fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”20 This 
fundamental right to a fair criminal trial that is untainted by executive inter-
ference or external manipulation reflects the very essence of human rights 
norms21and the law of occupation (as a subset of the laws and customs of 
war addressing the relations between military authorities and civilians are
prosecuted while in custody).22 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions refined previous articulations of this cornerstone principle by 
requiring an “impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the gener-
ally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure . . . .”23
As the interagency team theorized about the possibility of commis-
sions in the fall of 2001, the necessity of conducting trials of detained ter-
rorist suspects in conformity with international norms permeated almost 
every conversation. Legal experts thought carefully about the appropriate 
balance between the legitimacy of any trial process following the 9/11 
crimes, both from the perspective of international audiences and that of the 
average U.S. citizen. Though operations against al-Qaeda had the imprima-
tur of Security Council authority under Chapter VII,24
20 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 art. 14(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter 
ICCPR]. The U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has provided extensive analysis and 
comment on the ICCPR’s provisions to a right to a trial before a “tribunal established by 
law” set forth in Article 14. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 13, 
Equality Before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent 
Court Established by Law (Art. 14), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988); ICCPR General Com-
ment No. 17, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 14 (1994). The Commission commented on 
whether military courts constituted a court under “law,” stating that “the Covenant does not 
prohibit such categories of courts” while affirming and stressing that such courts, as any and 
all others, must afford the guarantees set forth in Article 14 of the ICCPR. General Comment 
No. 13, supra, ¶ 4.
the hostilities were 
focused on a non-state actor whose operations were not limited to a specific 
geographic scope. The military experts in the interagency working group
21 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 222; 
The American Convention on Human Rights art. 8(1), OEA/ser.K./XVI/1.1, doc. 65 rev. 
1.corr.1 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
22 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
147, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (making the deprivation of fundamen-
tal fairness during trial a grave breach of the Convention subject to universal jurisdiction)
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
23 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75(4), adopted June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Additional Protocol].
24 U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.
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repeatedly expressed the fear that the public mind would commingle the 
predictably controversial military commission procedures with the advanced 
state of military justice as practiced under the extant Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ).25
The dramatic reformation of the U.S. military justice system in the 
aftermath of World War II honed it into perhaps the fairest, flexible, and 
resilient military justice system on earth. Commanders must rely on military 
lawyers who are able to assist them anywhere in the world, and under any 
conditions, in applying the UCMJ as the vehicle for the command obliga-
tion to maintain good order and discipline. The concern in late 2001 was 
that hastily implemented military commissions could inflict lasting damage 
to the hard earned perception of military justice as a dependable and durable 
judicial process that is resilient enough to travel around the globe alongside 
U.S. service members while simultaneously ensuring the essential guaran-
tees of fairness and impartiality. 
The UCMJ structure preserves the long history of self-regulation by 
a parallel system of law under the authority of the executive branch rather 
than the existing federal court system authorized in Article III of the Consti-
tution. In fact, the entire military judiciary is composed of Article I judges 
who serve in a stovepiped organization designed to be insulated from the 
control of any commander at any level. Because military courts are con-
vened and created under Article I authority, the interpretation and applica-
tion of constitutional protections often varies slightly, and judges need not 
be appointed for life as they are in the federal system. The Supreme Court 
has upheld this sui generis system of Article I courts authorized by the 
UCMJ, thereby discounting arguments that military judges are inevitably 
held hostage to the demands of the executive branch or the hierarchical 
whims of military superiors.26
Similarly, military defense attorneys freely advocate the needs of 
their clients without the slightest concern that their professional duties will 
inevitably erode their prospects for promotion or assignment due to the dis-
pleasure of any official in the military hierarchy. The Rules for Military 
Commissions27
25 See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 836–54 (2000).
included a specific prohibition on external interference with 
26 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994) (holding that the Fifth Amendment pro-
tections may be applied in a different manner in the context of military proceedings and that 
fixed terms for military courts judges do not violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due 
process of law).
27 MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, supra note 6, at II-8. Rule 104(a) provides:
(a) General prohibitions.
(1) Convening authorities. No authority convening a military commission un-
der the M.C.A. may censure, reprimand, or admonish the military commis-
sion, or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the 
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the independence of military personnel working on any aspect of the pro-
ceedings. Perhaps signaling the intense political climate within which the 
commissions are conducted, Rule 104 indicates a shift from the practice of 
the prosecutors in the ordinary system of courts-martial who are answerable 
to the commander towards a commission process designed to operate under 
an independent convening authority.28
The practice of military commissions during the past seven years 
demonstrates that military attorneys and judges have done their duty in 
seeking justice according to law. Many human rights groups and lay ob-
servers unfamiliar with the discipline and dedication of military attorneys 
assumed that they would simply cave in to executive pressures to unfairly 
convict defendants with little due process. The record emphatically demon-
strates otherwise. 
Despite the fact that only three cases have been litigated to conclu-
sion, more than a hundred motions have been intensely fought and judicial 
rulings have frequently frustrated representatives of the government. The 
very first ruling in the first commission case was dispositive as the military 
judge dismissed the case without prejudice because the filings did not 
comply with the technical provisions of the Military Commissions Act.29
Defense attorneys have been widely lauded in both human rights circles and 
in the press as being diligent and dedicated in the defense of their clients. 
Not to put too fine a point on it, but the Commander-in-Chief in fact issued 
an order to the professional judges and lawyers of the U.S. military to strive 
for “full and fair” trials.30
findings or sentence adjudged by the military commission, or with respect to 
any other exercises of its or his functions or in the conduct of the proceedings.
For knowledgeable observers, it is wholly unre-
markable that military attorneys and judges have done their duty in zealous-
ly representing their clients and in upholding the law.
(2) All persons. No person may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized 
means, influence the action of a military commission or any member thereof, 
in reaching the findings or sentence in any case or the action of any conven-
ing, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to such authority’s judicial 
acts or the exercise of profession judgment by trial counsel or defense 
counsel.
Id.
28 Id.
29 See Reconsideration Ruling of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, United 
States v. Hamdan (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/
Hamdan-Jurisdiction%20After%20Reconsideration%20Ruling.pdf (reviewing the factual 
sufficiency of the evidence warranting the conclusion on reconsideration that Hamdan served 
as an unlawful enemy combatant taking direct part in hostilities against American forces and 
dismissing the defense challenge to the status hearing held by the Commission on the basis 
that the defendant had six attorneys present, full rights to confront witnesses and present 
evidence, and the open and transparent nature of the proceedings).
30 PMO, supra note 10, § 4(c)(2).
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On the other hand, as the Obama administration contemplates fur-
ther refinements to the existing commissions system, the integrity of the 
commissions process should be reinforced by the express export of two pro-
visions of the UCMJ. Firstly, the punitive provision of the general article, 
Article 134,31 should be made applicable to military commission proceed-
ings. President Obama need only issue an executive order to the effect that 
any interference with or obstruction of the work of determining detainee 
status or adjudicating cases prejudices the “good order and discipline in the 
armed forces” and is “of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed 
forces.”32 In addition, the Congress should extend the provisions of Article 
98 of the UCMJ33
Furthermore, Congress should merely add reference to Chapter 47A 
in the text of Article 98 in order to make any interference with the indepen-
dence or impartiality of the military commissions into a criminal act for any 
person subject to the UCMJ.
to include the Manual for Military Commissions. The 
punitive article at present applies to the UCMJ, which is contained in Chap-
ter 47 of Title 10. 
34
III. THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF U.S. COMMISSIONS
These salutary amendments would help to 
strengthen public and international perceptions of the process, though in 
truth they may be seldom used. At the same time, the specific inclusion of 
criminal sanctions for interference or obstruction with the work of military 
commissions would provide a remedy short of outright resignation for any 
military officer whose performance of duty is improperly infringed in the 
future. 
As the Attorney General wrote in 1865, “Congress has power to de-
fine, not to make, the laws of nations.”35
31 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).
Because the nations of the world 
developed the laws of war in response to military requirements, the nearly 
simultaneous development of tribunals to enforce those laws is completely 
logical, and the concomitant practice of using military commissions to pu-
32 Id.
33 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 898 (1976). Article 98 provides:
Any person subject to this chapter who—
(1) is responsible for unnecessary delay in the disposition of any case of a person 
accused of an offense under this chapter; or
(2) knowingly and intentionally fails to enforce or comply with any provision of 
this chapter regulating the proceedings before, during, or after trial of an accused; 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Id.
34 See id.
35 Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299 (1865) (emphasis in original).
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nish violations of international law dates back to at least 1688.36 In U.S. 
practice, military commissions originally developed as “common law war 
courts.” Early in our history, courts-martial tried Captain Nathan Hale and 
Major Andre for spying.37 In 1780, Congress passed a resolution calling for 
a special court-martial against Joshua Hett Smith on the charge of complici-
ty with Benedict Arnold’s treason.38 As the Articles of War were being 
modernized, the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army, General 
Crowder publicly defined the scope of military commissions and their 
common law origins.39 At a House hearing before the Committee on Mili-
tary Affairs, Crowder testified: “the constitution, composition, and jurisdic-
tion of these courts have never been regulated by statute . . . . It is highly 
desirable that this important war court should be continued to be governed 
as heretofore, by the laws of war rather than by statute.”40
36 See Articles of James II, art. LXIV, reprinted in COLONEL WILLIAM WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 919–28 (1920). Subsequent military codes restated the 
legality of using military commissions to punish violations of the laws and customs of war. 
See, e.g., British Articles of War of 1765, art. II, § XX, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra, at 
931.
37 See A. Wigfall Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 832, 832–
33 (1948) (discussing the history of the courts-martial of Captain Nathan Hale and Major 
Andre).
38 Id.; VI RESOLUTIONS, ACTS AND ORDERS OF CONGRESS 25 (1780). 
39 REVISION OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR, S. REP. NO. 63-229, at 59 (1914); Cf. REVISION OF 
THE ARTICLES OF WAR, S. REP. NO. 64-130, at 54–55 (1916).
40 S. REP. NO. 63-229, supra note 39, at 59 (emphasis added).
Mr. SWEET. Please explain what you mean by military commission.
Gen. CROWDER. That is our common law of war court . . . . This war court came 
into existence during the Mexican War, and was created by orders of Gen. Scott. It 
had jurisdiction to try all cases usually cognizable in time of peace by civil courts. 
Gen. Scott created another war court, called the “council of war,” with jurisdiction 
to try offenses against the laws of war. The constitution, composition, and jurisdic-
tion of these courts have never been regulated by statute. The council of war did 
not survive the Mexican War period, since which its jurisdiction has been taken 
over by the military commission. The military commission received express recog-
nition in the reconstruction acts, and its jurisdiction has been affirmed and sup-
ported by all our courts. It was extensively employed during the Civil War period 
and also during the Spanish-American War. It is highly desirable that this impor-
tant war court should be continued to be governed as heretofore, by the laws of war 
rather than by statute.
Mr. SWEET: There is more elasticity, I suppose?
Gen. CROWDER: Yes, sir; and the lack of statutory recognition has not prevented 
the Supreme Court from supporting the jurisdiction of the military commission in 
the trial of the gravest cases, and supporting it in the most explicit language. It is a 
most important institution in time of war. 
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The enactment of the Military Commissions Act marked the defini-
tive end of the American practice of convening military commissions as an 
unbridled aspect of the executive war-making authority. It extended the 
reach of military commissions beyond a setting of ongoing international 
conflict focused on a specific geographic area. Moreover, it introduced the 
term “unprivileged combatant” into U.S. law as the focus for the personnel 
jurisdiction of commissions. Just as in other nations, Presidents and military 
commanders have regularly convened commissions as a utilitarian approach 
to the conduct of hostilities or as a pragmatic necessity to administer occu-
pied territory.41 Until 2006, U.S. military commissions have been guided 
solely by the parameters of the substantive law and customs of war rather 
than constrained by statute. By extension, the federal bench has largely de-
ferred to the authority of the executive in enforcing the laws and customs of 
war,42 although many military commission results have been invalidated in 
practice by military authorities due to procedural irregularities or on eviden-
tiary grounds.43
Id. (emphasis added). Cf. S. REP. NO. 64-130, supra note 39, at 54–55. See also Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Military Affairs of the Senate on Establishment of 
Military Justice, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1182–83 (statement of Maj. Gen. Enoch H. Crowder).
41 Faced with the task of administering occupied Mexican territory, General Winfield 
Scott relied on his authority as a commander to convene tribunals authorized only by custo-
mary international law. Despite the void of codified domestic authority, the law supported 
General Scott’s exercise of command prerogative. In 1848, the U.S. Attorney General opined 
that U.S. courts had no jurisdiction over an Army officer who allegedly murdered a junior 
officer at Perote, Mexico. Jurisdiction of the Federal Judiciary, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 55 (1848).
The importance of this early opinion lies in the termination of the authority of the temporary 
military government at the time the military government ended. The opinion concluded that 
the rules and articles for the government of the Army no longer conveyed jurisdiction once 
the Army had been disbanded and been mustered out of the service.
For the purposes of modifying the UCMJ to have more utility during operations other 
than war, this early opinion is enlightening because the Attorney General recognized that 
“Congress can easily provide against a recurrence of the difficulties of the present case.” Id.
at 59. General Scott convened a military commission to try the case, but the accused escaped 
and fled to Georgia. While acknowledging the validity of military commissions “established 
under the law of nations by the rights of war,” the opinion concluded that the jurisdiction of 
the commission ended “by the restoration of the Mexican authorities . . . .” Id. at 58. The 
Supreme Court later reaffirmed the commander’s authority to punish civilians using military 
commissions in occupied territory. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177–78
(1857). Accord Mechanics’ & Traders’ Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276, 295–97
(1874); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 132–33 (1869); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 
How.) 164, 189–90 (1853).
42 See, e.g., Ex Parte Toscano, 208 F. 938, 940 (S.D. Cal. 1913) (denying habeas corpus 
petitions to two-hundred and eight Mexican Federalist soldiers who fled to the U.S. during 
the Mexican civil war and were interned under the Hague Conventions “for the purpose of 
depriving them of the power to leave American soil and renew hostilities.”).
43 See, e.g., Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878). Despite the jurisdictional suffi-
ciency of military commissions, many proceedings were disapproved due to procedural 
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At the time of this writing, the Obama Administration is reconsider-
ing the current statutory structure. The enactment of the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 unmistakably revalidated two essential premises that 
mark the confluence of domestic and international law. In the first place, it 
is entirely permissible for military commissions to coexist with other courts 
and to share concurrent jurisdiction.44
Conversely, if the guidelines for allocating jurisdiction are opaque 
to the public and to defendants, the Administration will be criticized for its 
lack of transparency and the appearance of selective and self-serving justice. 
Secondly, at a more basic level, the current legal debates unequivocally 
establish that the post-hoc creation of an accountability mechanism is per-
missible in light of modern human rights norms and the laws of war. Thus, 
despite potential friction with the President’s political base, ending military 
commissions or further limiting their flexibility runs the risk of eroding their 
utility for future Commanders-in-Chief to the legal and logical vanishing 
point. President Obama’s decisions in the near future will be made on policy 
grounds rather than on the basis of legal necessity. 
This puts the premium on the execu-
tive branch to promulgate clear guidance to military commanders and the 
Department of Justice as to the decision-making process for allocating ju-
risdiction among potential forums. This process must of necessity walk a 
very fine line in order to prevent trials from being tainted by executive inter-
ference or wholly improper command influence emanating from the White 
House or its designated proxies. 
A. The Statutory Basis for Modern Military Commissions 
Critics of the military commissions point out that the existing feder-
al courts have a conviction rate of more than ninety percent of the nearly 
three hundred defendants in terrorism-related cases in Article III courts 
since 9/11.45
irregularities. See, e.g., Opinion of Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt to President Abra-
ham Lincoln (Sept. 26, 1862), in Letters Sent-JAG, NARG 153 (Entry 1) (sentence disap-
proved because judge advocate not sworn); Opinion of Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt 
to Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler (Nov. 4, 1862), id. (sentence disapproved because records 
forwarded to Judge Advocate General were merely copies of original records); Opinion of 
Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt to Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler (Dec. 16, 1862), id.
(sentence disapproved because record did not show sufficient procedural protections for the 
accused); Gen. Order No. 255, Aug. 1, 1863, id. (death sentence disapproved because record 
did not show that the order convening the commission was read to the prisoner, and the pris-
oner did not have opportunity to challenge members, and members not sworn).
According to this argument, commissions are a disfavored 
forum of convenience because federal courts are open and functioning. To 
44 See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948(a) (2006).
45 RICHARD B. ZABEL AND JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS—2009 UPDATE AND 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 9 (2009).
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complicate matters, Congress has expanded the substantive crimes original-
ly listed by the Department of Defense as being triable by military commis-
sion to include offenses that were previously subject only to Article III ju-
risdiction, such as material support to terrorism and conspiracy.46
Setting aside a detailed discussion of the circumstances under which 
these crimes constitute violations of the laws and customs of war which are 
therefore appropriately within the jurisdiction of military commissions as 
opposed to preexisting Article III courts, a small range of offenses have 
proven to be the crux of commission jurisdiction. Their discontinuation 
would shift the bulk of cases into federal courts as a practical matter. Far 
from invalidating their use, the simple truth that military commission juris-
diction overlaps with that of other federal courts marks a linear continuation 
of the U.S. practice by which prosecutions for violations of the laws and 
customs of war are allocated to federal criminal jurisdiction.
During the Civil War, Union Army General Order Number 100 de-
clared that the common law of war allowed military commissions to prose-
cute “cases which do not come within the Rules and Articles of War, or the 
jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts-martial.”47 By 1916, however, 
Congress adopted Article of War 15 to specifically recognize that com-
manders could prosecute violations of the law of war in either general 
courts-martial or military commissions.48 Congress added explicit courts-
martial jurisdiction over persons who violate the law of war in the 1916 
revision to the Articles of War.49
46 See 10 U.S.C. § 950(v) (2006) (detailing the provisions of Article 3 of the Military 
Commissions Act).
During hearings on the proposed amend-
ments, Major General Enoch Crowder, the Judge Advocate General of the 
Army, adamantly testified that statutory courts-martial jurisdiction “saves to
these war courts [military commissions] the jurisdiction they now have and 
makes it a concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial, so that the military 
47 General Order No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United 
States in the Field, ¶ 13 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 3 (Die-
trich Schindler & Ji Toman, eds., 1988).
48 In 1916, Congress held extensive hearings on revising the existing Articles of War. 
The revised articles added article 2 which defined the class of persons who would be subject 
to the jurisdiction of military courts-martial. The Judge Advocate General of the Army re-
peatedly reminded Congress that military commissions had jurisdiction under international 
law which would not change as a result of amending the American Articles of War. Hearings 
on Senate Bill 3191, Subcomm. on Military Affairs of the Senate, reprinted in S. REP. NO. 64-
130, supra note 39.
49 Article 2 of the Articles of War defined the class of “persons subject to military law.”
41 Stat. 787, art. 2 (re-enacted in 1920). In its 1916 form, Article 2 included some persons 
who, by the law of war, were prior to 1916 triable under the common law of war at military 
commissions. The 1916 version of Article 2 conveyed court-martial jurisdiction over “all 
retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United 
States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Id.
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commander in the field in time of war will be at liberty to employ either 
form of court that happens to be convenient.”50
Article 21 of the current UCMJ is based on Article of War 15. After 
restating the concurrent jurisdiction of general courts-martial and military 
commissions, Article 21 provides that military commissions may convene 
“with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war 
may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tri-
bunals.”51 The parallel provision for ordinary courts-martial is found in Ar-
ticle 18, which conveys general courts-martial jurisdiction over “any person 
who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal” and allows 
“any punishment permitted by the law of war.”52
50 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 n.31 (1946) (quoting Hearings on Senate Bill 3191, 
Subcomm. on Military Affairs of the Senate, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in S. REP. No. 
64-130, supra note 39, at 40). In earlier testimony before Congress, General Crowder ex-
plained:
The language of Article 18 
mirrors that of Article 21, and the operational jurisdiction of general courts-
martial is similarly restricted.
The next article, No. 15, is entirely new, and the reasons for its insertion are these: 
In our War with Mexico two war courts were brought into existence by the orders 
of Gen. Scott, viz, the military commission and the council of war. By the military 
commission, Gen. Scott tried cases cognizable in time of peace by civil courts, and 
by the council of war he tried offenses against the laws of war. The council of war 
did not survive the Mexican War period, and in our subsequent wars, its jurisdic-
tion has been taken over by the military commission, which during the Civil War 
period tried more than 2,000 cases. While the military commission has not been 
formally authorized by statute, its jurisdiction as a war court has been upheld by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. It is an institution of the greatest impor-
tance in a period of war and should be preserved. In the new code, the jurisdiction 
of courts-martial has been somewhat amplified by the introduction of the phrase 
“Persons subject to military law.” There will be more instances in the future than in 
the past when the jurisdiction of courts-martial will overlap that of the war courts, 
and the question would arise whether Congress having vested jurisdiction by the 
statute the common law of war jurisdiction was not ousted. I wish to make it per-
fectly plain by the new article that in such cases the jurisdiction of the war court is 
concurrent.
S. REP. NO. 63-229, supra note 39. General Crowder testified in exactly the same language to 
the House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs on May 14, 1912. Id. at 28–29.
51 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).
52 Id. § 818. Implementing this statutory authority, Rule for Courts-Martial 1003(b)(10)
(2008) provides that, “in cases tried under the law of war, a general court-martial may ad-
judge any punishment not prohibited by the law of war.” See Fourth Geneva Convention, 
supra note 22, art. 68 (providing some limits to the discretion of military tribunals to adjudge 
punishments under the law of war). Rule for Court Martial 201 recognizes the dual jurisdic-
tional grounds over violations of the law of war as well as offenses in violation of civil sta-
tutes when an occupying force declares martial law. See also id. arts. 4, 64, 66 (outlining the 
basis for declaring martial law and enforcing civil laws as an occupying power).
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Even if the normal courts-martial had personal jurisdiction over un-
lawful enemy combatants (which would be possible only in the very rare 
instances that a terrorist suspect met the requirements of UCMJ Article 2), 
President Obama need not restrict jurisdiction of war crimes allegations 
against unlawful combatants to any predetermined forum in light of our 
practice and precedent. Such decisions must be made on an individualized, 
case by case basis, which in turn raises the real possibility that military 
commission jurisdiction will itself be viewed with inherent suspicion.
Unless Congress amends the UCMJ to permit terrorist suspects to 
face trial before ordinary courts-martial, military commissions would likely 
soon be regarded as the court of convenience to relegate the “bad cases” that 
might otherwise erode public confidence in the Article III courts. This pos-
sibility, in turn, raises concern among military practitioners that the reputa-
tion and credibility of the modern military justice system will be compro-
mised, which has the collateral consequence of undermining the profession-
al military attorneys who have done their duty in the interests of justice.
B. The Human Rights Basis for the Military Commissions Act 
The reaffirmation that military commissions can have a lawful role 
alongside traditional Article III courts and ordinary courts-martial is perhaps 
the most important benchmark from which the Obama Administration can 
gauge forward progress. Regardless of the procedural forms adopted, inter-
national law is clear that no accused should face punishment unless con-
victed pursuant to a fair trial affording all of the essential guarantees embo-
died in widespread State practice.53 Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions states with particularity that only a “regularly constituted 
court” may pass judgment on an accused person.54 Though the detailed due 
process requirements inherent in Common Article 355
53 For a summary of State practice and its implementation in treaty norms and military 
manuals around the world, see 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 352–75 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study].
are not specified, 
54 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 22, art. 3.
55 The U.S. has not ratified Protocol I or Protocol II, though in fact many provisions of 
each are accepted and practiced as customary international norms. See, e.g., Diane F. Oren-
tlicher and Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Be-
fore Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 661 (2002).
The rights that must be accorded to unprivileged combatants in criminal proceed-
ings have evolved substantially since World War II. Any doubts concerning the 
scope and content of these rights were put to rest with the elaboration of Article 75 
of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Although the United 
States has not ratified the Protocol, it accepts many of its provisions as being decla-
ratory of customary law; Article 75 is such a provision par excellence. Largely in-
spired by human rights law, this article requires that unprivileged combatants be 
accorded in all circumstances trials by impartial and regularly constituted courts 
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commentators tend to use the benchmarks enumerated in Article 75 of Ad-
ditional Protocol I as a suitable proxy. Thus, it is wholly defensible under 
the laws and customs of war to conclude that unlawful combatants (or in the 
language of Article 75 those who “do not benefit from more favourable 
treatment under the Convention or this Protocol”)56 are entitled to a trial 
before “an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally 
recognized principles of regular judicial procedure.”57
Interpreting this provision in light of State practice, the Internation-
al Committee of the Red Cross concluded that a judicial forum is “regularly
constituted if it has been established and organized in accordance with the 
laws and procedures already in force in a country.”
It is no accident that 
the Executive Summary to the Manual for Courts-Martial quotes the re-
quirements of Article 3 and notes that the Manual is intended to meet that 
standard. 
58 Indeed, justice cannot 
be carried on the wings of executive mandate. The creation of specialized 
courts designed to serve the whims of power rather than the ends of law is 
one of the hallmarks of tyranny. Like the Nazi regime before them,59 the 
ruling Ba’athists in Saddam’s Iraq created “Special” or “Revolutionary” 
courts to impose political punishments at the hands of obedient minions 
rather than trained legal professionals.60 The conviction of the Chief Judge 
Awad Bandar of Saddam’s Revolutionary Courts for the crime against hu-
manity of murder marks the first time since World War II that a jurist has 
been convicted for perverting the power of the law into a tool of political 
power.61
that, at a minimum, afford inter alia the presumption of innocence, the right to 
counsel before and during trial, the right of defendants to call witnesses and to ex-
amine witnesses against them, freedom from ex post facto laws, and the right of 
defendants not to testify against themselves or to confess their guilt. 
There was widespread commentary following the PMO that the 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Article 6 of Protocol II also applies to non-international armed con-
flicts, though its specified rights do not include the following rights found in Protocol I, 
Article 75: (1) to be tried by a “regularly constituted” court to examine or have examined 
witnesses against him or her; (2) to public announcement of sentence; and (3) prohibition 
against double jeopardy. See First Additional Protocol, supra note 23, arts. 75(4), 75(4)(i), 
75(4)(h).
56 First Additional Protocol, supra note 23, art. 75(7)(b).
57 Id. art. 75(4).
58 ICRC Study, supra note 53, at 355.
59 INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 153–73 (Deborah 
Lucas Schneider, trans., 1991).
60 R. Chandrasekaran, Tribunal Planners Hope to Start Trials by Spring, WASH. POST,
Dec. 16, 2003, at A1.
61 See MICHAEL A. NEWTON & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE: THE TRIAL 
AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, 181–83 (2008) (describing the import of Judge 
Awad al-Bandar’s conviction in light of the Alstoetter case in which ten Nazi-era judges 
were convicted). 
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U.S. had embarked down the same road of expediency and politicized jus-
tice. In fact, the sparse structure of the original PMO has been dramatically 
clarified and a whole superstructure of procedural regularity and detailed 
guidance regulates U.S. military commissions at the time of this writing.62
Every domestic context is unique, even when applying normative 
principles of international law that are common to all nations. For example, 
in the domestic prosecutions in Argentina, the trials were conducted using 
special procedures necessitated by the volume of information and the num-
ber of victims in comparison to normal crimes.63 Furthermore, tribunals 
enforcing international humanitarian law have permitted evidence so long as 
it is “relevant” and “necessary for the determination of the truth.”64 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) summarizes 
the legal consensus described above as requiring that a tribunal be “estab-
lished by law.” 65 The U.N. Human Rights Commission adopted a function-
al test that the tribunal should “genuinely afford the accused the full guaran-
tees” in its procedural protections.66
Litigating its first case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was forced to determine whether the procedural 
rights of the perpetrator are violated per se by the prosecution of an accused 
before a post hoc tribunal created after the commission of the crimes.67
The important consideration in determining whether a tribunal has been 
“established by law” is not whether it was pre-established or established 
for a specific purpose or situation; what is important is that it be set up by 
Not-
ing that the ICCPR drafters rejected language specifying that only “pre-
established” fora would provide sufficient human rights protections, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber concluded that:
62 See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT 
OF 2006: ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL RULES AND COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS DOD RULES 
AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (Sept 27, 2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33688.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
63 See UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, BUILDING THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL:
LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT 122, at
10 (2004), available at http://www.usip.org/resources/building-iraqi-special-tribunal-lessons-
experiences-international-criminal-justice.
64 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(3), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
65 ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 14(1).
66 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment on Article 14, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/43/40 (1988); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Cariboni v. Uruguay, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (Oct. 
27, 1987). The Inter-American Commission has taken a similar approach. See, e.g., Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1972, OEA/Ser. P, AG/doc. 305/73 rev. 1, 14 March 1973, at 1; 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1973, 2–4, OEA/Ser. P, AG/doc. 409/174 (March 5, 1974).
67 MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL 
WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 104–06 (1997). 
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a competent organ in keeping with the relevant legal procedures, and 
should that it observes the requirements of procedural fairness.68
Accepting this benchmark of legitimacy, modern U.S. military 
commissions meet the criteria of Common Article 3 better than the ad hoc
international tribunals because they are designed to disfavor deviation from 
preexisting Article III and UCMJ procedures. Article 36 of the current 
UCMJ grants the President the flexibility to craft trial procedures for courts-
martial and military commissions which “shall, so far as he considers prac-
ticable, apply the principles of law and rules of evidence generally recog-
nized in the trial of cases in the United States district courts . . . .” 69 This 
provision ensures that U.S. Military Commissions hew closely to the “regu-
larly constituted” requirement found in human rights law and Common 
Article 3.70
The language of the current Article 36 derives from the 1920 Ar-
ticles of War and thus predates any hint of military commission jurisdiction 
over transnational terrorist acts. Although the purpose in drafting a uniform 
code was to unify procedures between and among the services as to courts-
martial,
There is no evidence in the legislative record that Congress 
intended to align the UCMJ with the international norms, but the fortuity 
strengthens President Obama’s legal argument for retaining military 
commissions.
71 Article 36(b) further stipulates that the procedures for military 
commissions be as uniform as possible between the services.72
68 Prosecutor v. Tadi Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 1995 WL 17205280, Decision on the 
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 45 (Oct. 2, 1995).
Thus, the 
69 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2006).
70 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
71 A Bill to Unify, Consolidate, Revise and Codify the Articles of War, the Articles for the 
Gov’t of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard, and to Enact and Establish 
a Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before the H. Sub Comm. on 
Armed Services, 81st Cong. 597 (1949) (statement of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2498].
72 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2006). “All rules and regulations made under this article shall be 
uniform insofar as practicable . . . .” See also Hearings on H.R. 2498, supra note 71, at 1015.
Chairman Brooks commented on this provision and stated, “I think it would be unthinkable, 
after we go to all this painstaking trouble to get a unified bill, that the President would pre-
scribe three separate rules.” Id. Mr Rivers also asked, “[a]s a result of this, neither the Presi-
dent nor any of the three services could have any authority to agree on any rules of procedure 
contrary to the discussion before this committee or the intent of the Congress?” Id. Mr. Lar-
kin: “I think that is provided . . . .” Id. Mr. Smart: “But it will show what the intent of Con-
gress is, that it shall be uniform in every possible instance.” Id. Mr. Hardy: “With respect to 
all the services?” Id. Mr. Smart: “Yes, sir.” Id. In further discussing Article 39(a), Mr. Larkin 
highlighted certain instances in which the rules applicable to federal courts would not be 
“practicable,” noting rules of evidence on search warrants and authentication that might be 
impracticable to apply in a battlefield situation. Id. at 1017.
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legislative record of the UCMJ establishes that military commissions were 
considered to be common law courts with distinctive rules and procedures 
drawn from, but not identical to, those found in court-martial or Article III 
courts.73
In light of the permissive structure of the UCMJ and of uniform 
U.S. practice regarding past “common law war courts,” it would be illogical 
and incorrect to postulate that U.S. practice requires complete consistency 
between the procedures applicable to courts-martial, military commissions, 
and Article III courts. For example, when debating the applicable UCMJ 
procedures for commissions during hearings in 1949, the Assistant General 
Counsel to the Secretary of Defense, replied to a question regarding the type 
of rules used to try the German Quirin saboteurs, “[t]hey are rules that are 
promulgated by the President.”74 Professional Committee staff member Mr. 
Robert Smart noted that “[w]e are not prescribing rules of procedure for 
military commissions here. This only pertains to courts martial.”75
For the purposes of human rights law, U.S. military commissions 
are “established by law” because they are designed to provide the full range 
of human rights to the accused and are based on the almost unassailable 
confluence of legislative power, judicial construction, and executive 
mandate. The PMO was based on the uncoordinated assertion of executive 
power. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court invalidated the commis-
sions created by President Bush based on the mere invocation of executive 
power on the basis that the structure was noncompliant with the require-
ments of Article 36.76
Thus, the synergistic efforts of the judicial, legislative, and execu-
tive branches make the current military commissions completely defensible 
from a legal perspective and without question meet the “established by law” 
criteria.
In the aftermath of Hamdan, President Bush con-
sulted with the Congress and developed an extensive Manual for Courts 
Martial that was promulgated by executive order and authorized by the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The interlocking procedures of the current Military Commissions 
Act as implemented in the Manual for Military Commissions signal the end 
of unregulated and unexamined executive discretion in the pursuit of na-
tional security interests. President Obama faces difficult legal and policy 
dilemmas at the time of this writing. The legal quandaries are heightened by 
73 Id. at 1016–17.
74 Id. at 1017.
75 Id. (emphasis added).
76 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 561 (2006).
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the presence in the dock of alleged co-conspirators responsible for the at-
tacks of September 11. In practice, the military commissions have not been 
the charade of justice created by an over-powerful and unaccountable chief 
executive that critics predicted.
Military judges have been vigorous in demanding respect for the 
full range of defendants’ rights. Professional judges have ensured to date 
that the processes never serve as a subterfuge for subverting defendants’ 
rights. No commission proceedings have admitted hearsay evidence, much 
less any evidence derived from tainted interrogation techniques. Further-
more, Federal courts are active in overseeing, and on occasion overturning, 
the work of the military commissions and the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals that are a necessary gateway for so-called “unlawful combatants” 
to stand trial in a military commission. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt told the American people and the as-
sembled Congress at the beginning of World War II that “[t]he mighty ac-
tion that we are calling for cannot be based on a disregard of all things 
worth fighting for. . . .”77 The new administration will determine whether 
the role of the commissions expands beyond the core al-Qaeda defendants, 
and will prescribe the roles and regulations applicable to commissions in the 
future. The synergy of Article III courts and military commissions is wholly 
new in American history, and if nothing else, the past eight years of legal 
wrangling and legislative mandate have wrought a system that balances 
individual rights and liberties with the overarching interests of the U.S. in 
securing her citizens and seeking justice.
77 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms, U.S. House of Representatives, Janu-
ary 6, 1941, reprinted in GREAT AMERICAN SPEECHES 161, 164 (Gregory R. Suriano ed., 
1993).
